We report data from double-auction experiments in China and the U.S. using groups of exclusively females, exclusively males and mixed gender participants. We find that female groups in China generate price bubbles statistically identical to those produced by exclusively male groups in both China and the U.S., all of which are significantly larger than the bubbles produced by exclusively female groups in the U.S. Our results suggest that gender differences in financial markets may be sensitive to culture.
Introduction
Financial volatility caused by asset price bubbles blowing and bursting has occurred regularly, from Dutch tulip mania several centuries ago to the 1929 U.S. stock market bubble and to the recent 2008 U.S. house price bubble. Market crashes often create enormously detrimental economic consequences -perhaps even economic depressions.
Understanding asset price volatility is surely important, and has been an active subject of theoretical and empirical research (Shiller, 2015; Fama and French, 1993) .
Some evidence suggests that excess price volatility -the bubble and burst cycleis driven by male but not female trading behavior (Eckel and Fullbrunn, 2015) . The findings of that paper are that all-male markets produce the typical bubble and crashing pattern while all-female markets generate small and sometimes even negative bubbles 1 . This evidence was collected in Western universities, using primarily Western participants.
Evidence suggests, however, that the economic behavior of Asian females is not always consistent with that of western females. For example, although men are found more willing to compete than women (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) in the west, female Han Chinese are found to be as willing to compete as males (Zhang, 2015) .
The author suggests that radical Communist policies promoting gender equality and female labor force participation among the Han Chinese may have helped shape a taste for competition 2 . Similarly, Booth et al. (2016) find that Beijing females from the 1958 birth cohort are more competitive than their male counterparts and also attribute this to the change of institution and social norm during that period of China.
These findings seem to suggest that the gender differences are not only innate but at least partially socially determined, while social contexts or cultures differ worldwide and could vary over time.
In view of this, it is unclear whether the gender differences in financial trading discovered in Western samples would hold in Asian countries, such as China. Our paper is a step towards addressing this. We conduct classic bubbles experiments in China using groups of exclusively males, exclusively females and mixed-gender participants, and compare these to new bubbles experiments run in the United States.
Our main result is that exclusively female groups in the U.S. bubble statistically significantly less than all other gender-homogenous groups we observed. Further, these other groups -exclusively male or female in China and exclusively male in the U.S. -all bubble in statistically identical ways. Further, mixed gender groups bubble significantly more in China than in the U.S. Indeed, mixed gender groups in the U.S.
bubble less than any other group in our study. Consequently, our results suggest that female trading behavior is sensitive to culture, perhaps in a way that male trading is not.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the experiment design and procedures. Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes and discusses.
Literature review

Gender composition in experimental asset market
Our study is closely related to and motivated by the work of gender differences in experimental asset markets. Using the experimental asset market mechanism of Smith et al. (1988) and same-gender market design, Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) find that all-female markets are less prone to bubbles than all-male markets, and sometimes even generate negative bubbles. Eckel and Fullbrunn (2017) find there is no significant difference between all-female and all-male markets if gender is not revealed, and hence conclude that common expectations may play a key role in asset price volatility. However, in a constant fundamental value framework, Cueva and Rustichini (2015) , also focusing on Western participants, find that female-only and male-only groups generate similar bubbles but that mispricing is much lower in mixed-gender markets. Also, using a constant fundamental value market, Holt et al.
(2016) do not observe gender differences in bubble behavior.
In this paper, to study whether exclusively female groups may trade differently than male groups across different cultures, we follow Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) and use a traditional decreasing fundamental value design. The advantage to doing this is that we are able to compare the patterns in our data directly with those found in Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) .
Gender composition in competition and risk taking
Several studies find that single-gender environments increase women's willingness to compete as well as their willingness to take risks. Gneezy et al. (2003) find that women perform better in single-sex (participants could see each other) tournament than in mixed tournament, and the gender gap decreases in the single-sex tournament. Booth and Nolen (2012) find that girls are more likely to choose risky outcomes when assigned to all-girl groups 3 , and girls from single-sex schools are as likely to choose the real-stakes gamble as boys from either coed or single-sex schools. Finally, in a study using the similar subject pool as ours, Chen et al. (2015) find in a Chinese sample that women bid the highest value when bidding against other women in the case where one's opponent's gender is revealed.
Gender differences in competition
Although research suggests males are more competitive than females in general 4 , recently, substantial experimental evidence has demonstrated that gender differences in willingness to compete are both culture and context dependent. For example, Gneezy et al. (2009) find that males in a patriarchal society are willing to compete at roughly twice the rate as females. In contrast, women in matrilineal society are more competitive than men. Andersen et al. (2013) reports no gender difference at any age in the matrilineal society, while girls become less competitive around puberty in patriarchal societies. Similarly, Cardenas et al. (2012) finds that gender differences in preferences for competition vary across countries differing in gender equality.
In addition to culture, gender differences in competition also vary with the type of task. For instance, Gunther et al. (2010) find that men react more strongly than 3 Participants in one group sat together in an auditorium so they could see each other. 4 See a literature review in Croson and Gneezy (2009). women in male stereotyped tasks, but they react equally in neutral tasks and women react stronger than men in female-stereotyped tasks.
Gender differences in risk preference
Similar to the studies of gender differences in competition, although many studies report that females are more risk averse than males (Croson and Gneezy, 2009 ), some studies also report cultural differences in this. For example, Finucane et al. (2000) find that the gender difference only exists in white people and not in any another ethnic group, which, as Croson and Gneezy (2009) suggest, may imply that cultural biases cause gender differences in risk taking. Schubert et al. (1999) find that gender differences in financial risk decisions depends on the decision frame. In particular, females seem more sensitive to risk in the loss frame.
Experiment design
Our experiment design and procedures are nearly identical to those reported by Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) . The experiment includes asset market decisions, risk task decisions and a survey. The details of the asset market, which follows Smith et al. (1988) , are as follows.
Asset market
Nine participants trade 18 assets during a sequence of 15 double-auction trading periods, each lasting four minutes. At the end of every period, each share pays a dividend of 0, 8, 28, or 60 tokens with equal probability. Since the expected dividend equals 24 tokens in every period, the expected (or fundamental) value in period t equals 24 × (16 − t), i.e., 360 in period 1, 336 in period 2, and so on until it reaches a value of 24 in period 15. Traders are endowed with shares and cash before the first period. Three subjects receive three shares and 225 tokens, three subjects receive two shares and 585 tokens, and the remaining three subjects receive one share and 945
tokens. Subjects need to forecast the trading price of all the upcoming periods at the beginning of each period. The forecast is incentivized according to the forecasting accuracy 5 . The exchange rate is $0.01 to 1 token.
We first ran the asset market experiment. The asset market task is completed using the z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) program that Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) provided on the AEA website. We then ran the risk task using paper and pencil (see the appendix for detailed instructions). Following this we asked the participants to complete two surveys. The first is from Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) . The second survey is the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI; Bem, 1974 ) which aims to test subjects' masculinity and femininity.
The experiments were conducted in parallel at George Mason University (GMU) in the U.S. and at Central South University (CSU) in China. All of the instructions and surveys used in CSU were translated from English to Chinese and then translated back into English to ensure translation accuracy 6 .
We conducted 19 sessions both in GMU and CSU respectively, with each session including 9 participants. Six sessions included all females, six included all males and the remaining seven sessions each included five females and four males 7 .
We ended with 171 subjects both in GMU and CSU, so 342 in total. Similar to Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) , the participants waited at the reception area prior to entering the lab, so they could see all the other participants from the same session. The average payoff is $35.9 and ￥77.4 in GMU and CSU respectively.
Results
Price Patterns Across Treatments
We begin with an informal discussion of the price patterns across treatments, followed by a formal statistical comparison in the next section. Figure 1 describes the median of the median session transaction prices for each round and by treatment in 5 Each forecast earns the participant 5, 2 or 1 tokens, corresponding to the forecast accuracy of being within 10%, 25% and 50% of the actual price (for details, see instructions in the Appendix). 6 We modified or deleted a small number of survey questions that were irrelevant to Chinese students. For example, we did not query about marriage because almost no students are married at these ages. Further, in the religious options we added "no religion". 7 There is one exceptional session that included four females and five males in GMU in the mixed-gender markets.
GMU and CSU 8 . Figure 1A shows the comparison between U.S. and China for the all-female markets. One can observe that exclusively female groups in China generate positive bubbles in most periods, which is the typical bubble pattern in experimental asset markets. The transaction prices in CSU are higher than GMU in most periods. It is perhaps interesting to note that the pattern of transaction prices in all-female treatments in GMU is quite similar to the all-female groups reported by Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) .
The results for all-male markets are shown in Figure 1B . Note first that both of the patterns of the transaction prices in GMU and in CSU follow the typical bubble style of booming and then bursting to fundamental value. The two lines are quite similar at the first several periods but the exclusively males in CSU converge to fundamental value earlier than in GMU. Comparing the all-female groups in CSU in Figure 1A and the all-male groups in GMU in Figure 1B , we observe that these patterns are quite similar to each other (we provide a formal statistical comparison below). 
Statistical Comparison of Prices Across Treatments
To compare the statistical difference between GMU and CSU across all of the three types of markets, we compute the seven bubble measures following Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) . Table 1 
All-female markets: GMU versus CSU
From Table 1A we observe that all-female markets in CSU generate considerable bubbles, while bubbles are on average negative in all-female markets in GMU. In all-female markets in CSU, the average of Average Bias is 45.86 and it is positive in five of the six sessions. The average of Average Bias is -11.9 in GMU and it is negative in three sessions and positive in the other three sessions. Using a two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we can reject the null hypothesis that Average Bias equals or is lower than zero in favor of the alternative hypothesis that Average Bias is higher than zero in the all-female markets (p=0.046) in CSU but not in GMU(p=0.916).
Moreover, average Boom Duration is higher than ten periods in all-female markets in CSU and prices are consistently above fundamental value for at least one-half of the 15 trading periods in all the 6 sessions expect one with 7 periods. Boom Duration The two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests with six observations in each group in column three of Table 1A show that the Average Bias in all-female markets in CSU is significantly higher than in GMU (p=0.055). We find no difference in Total Dispersion. 9 We find the Positive Deviation in CSU is higher than in GMU and the difference is economically large although it is not statistically significant (p=0.200).
The Negative Deviation in CSU is significantly lower than in GMU (p=0.037). The two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests also show that the Boom Duration is significantly higher and the Bust Duration is significantly lower in all-female markets in CSU than in GMU.
Consistent with Figure 1A , the statistical comparisons indicate that exclusively female groups in CSU generate considerable bubbles while the exclusively female groups at GMU generate small (even negative) bubbles. Table 1B compares all-male markets in GMU and CSU. The overpricing measure Average Bias indicates that the all-male markets both in GMU and CSU exhibit large bubbles. The average of Average Bias is 77.6 in GMU and 57.7 in CSU and is positive in all six sessions in both GMU and CSU. Using a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we find that Average Bias is significantly higher than zero both in GMU (p=0.028) and CSU (p=0.028). The two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests show there is no significant difference of Average Bias between GMU and CSU (p=0.749).
All-male markets: GMU versus CSU
The Total Dispersion is significantly higher in GMU than in CSU, which is consistent with Figure 1B which shows that transaction prices converge to the fundamental value more quickly in CSU than in GMU. However, the Negative Deviation and the Bust Duration are significantly higher in GMU than in CSU. The Boom Duration is significantly lower in GMU. higher in all-females markets than in all-male markets, all of which are consistent with Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) .
Mixed-gender markets: GMU versus CSU
Within country comparison
In contrast, we find there is no significant difference in the Average Bias in CSU between all-female and all-male markets (p=0.522). However, Negative Deviation and Bust Duration are significantly lower, and Boom Duration is significantly higher, in all-male than all-female markets.
We also compared the difference between all-female markets in GMU and all-male markets in CSU as well as all-male markets in GMU and all-females markets in CSU (last two rows in Table 2 ). The results show that nearly all bubbles measures except Positive Deviation are significantly different between exclusively female groups in GMU and exclusively male groups in CSU. However, none of the measures is significant between exclusively male groups in GMU and exclusively female groups in CSU.
Turn now to the mixed-gender markets. In contrast to Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) , who found market outcomes with mixed-gender groups to lie between the single-gender market outcomes, we find in both GMU and CSU that mixed-gender markets exhibit less bubbles than both the exclusively male and exclusively females markets. For example, the average of Average Bias in CSU in mixed-gender markets is 20.01, lower than in all-female markets and in all-male markets, though the difference is not statistically significant. This finding is consistent with Cueva and Rustichini (2015) who report more price stability with mixed-gender markets than single gender markets. 
Summary of the comparison of Average Bias between all-female and all-male markets
Combining the information from Table 1 and Table 2 , we draw a graph to demonstrate the comparison of Average Bias (the key measure of bubbles) between exclusively female groups and exclusively male groups within and between countries.
As shown in Figure 2 , all-females markets in U.S. is significantly different from all the other three groups, i.e. all-male markets in U.S. and all-female and all-male markets in China. However, each two of all the other three groups are not significantly different from each other. 
Price forecasts
Prior to each trading period, we asked participants to predict prices for all subsequent trading periods (e.g., prior to period 3 they would be asked to predict prices for periods 3 to 15). Forecast accuracy was incentivized (see the instructions in the Appendix). Note that forecasts prior to period one cannot be affected by trading activity. Consequently, we use those forecasts as a measure of prior beliefs and compare these priors across countries within the same gender. We also find that there is significant difference of the forecast bias for all future periods between all-female and all-male markets in GMU ( p=0.010, two-sided Mann-Whitney U-Test).
Overall, we find significant forecast bias only in all-female markets in GMU in all of the four exclusively gender groups. Notes: All of the forecast in this table are forecasts before the first period, i.e. the forecast before trading takes place. Forecast bias = forecast price -average trading price. Forecast1 and forecast bias1 are the forecast for period1. Forecast and forecast bias are the forecast for all the future period including period 1. We exclude one outlier in all-male markets in GMU which is 6600 for the forecast of the first period. The p-value is from a two-sided Mann-Whitney U-Test and a two-sided T-Test.
Comparison to Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015)
We compared bubble measures in all-female markets between Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) and our CSU data, and found convergent evidence for the results reported above in Table 4 . In particular, the Average Bias and Boom Duration are significantly higher and the Negative Deviation and Bust Duration are significantly lower in China than in U.S. female-only markets. In comparison to the female-only data from GMU, the significance of the difference in Average Bias is greater (p=0.016) 10 .
Further, we also compared bubble measures in all-female markets in Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) with our CSU and GMU all-male markets, respectively. Both of the all-male markets in CSU and GMU are distinct from the all-female markets in Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) . 
Conclusion and discussion
Gender difference in experimental asset markets and the real financial markets have received substantial discussion in both academia and in industry, especially since the 2008 financial crisis. Males, who comprise the majority of financial markets traders, are argued to be the source of excessive and risky trading, a potential contributer to the financial crisis. Academic evidence from the West suggests that females generate smaller bubbles than males (Eckel and Fullbrunn, 2015) . We investigated whether this result holds also in the East, and in particular China. We ran exclusively females, exclusively males and mixed-gender experimental asset markets both in U.S. and China. We found that, unlike the all-female's pricing style in U.S., exclusively female trading groups in China display the same and typical bubble producing and crashing patterns as males. We find no significant difference in all-male markets between U.S. and China.
An explanation for the difference in trading behavior between Eastern and
Western women could be radical Communist policies that promoted gender equality and female labor force participation. The labor force participation of women aged 15
and over was 67.9% in China in 2010, much higher than most of the OECD countries including the U.S. (Zhang, 2015) 11 . These policies and social norms may have increased females' willingness to compete. If so this suggests that gender differences are at least partially socially determined. Since social contexts and cultures differ worldwide and may change over time, we should perhaps recognize that culture can impact the effectiveness of gender-based policies meant to increase price-stability in financial markets.
Gender differences in economic behavior are also impacted by stereotype (Coffman, 2014) , and may be one reason females are less willing to compete (Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2013) . Stereotype, however, is a social construct (Bian et al. (2017 ) Bordalo et al., 2016 Gneezy et al. 2009; Rosin, 2010) , which like culture may vary across time and place. Asset market instructions
General Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. If you follow the instructions and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The experiment will consist of a sequence of trading periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell shares. Money in this experiment is expressed in tokens (100 tokens = 1 Dollar).
How To Use The Computerized Market.
The goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. On the top panel of your computer screen you can see the Money you have available to buy shares and the number of shares you currently have. If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled "Enter Ask price". In that text area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell a share, and then select "Submit Ask Price". Please do so now. You will notice that 9 numbers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the column entitled "Ask Price". The lowest ask price will always be on the top of that list and will be highlighted. If you press "BUY", you will buy one share for the lowest current ask price. You can also highlight one of the other prices if you wish to buy at a price other than the lowest.
Please purchase a share now by highlighting a price and selecting "BUY". Since each of you had put a share for sale and attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares you started out with. This is because you bought one share and sold one share. When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase, but your shares increase by one. When you sell a share, your Money increases by the price of the sale, but your shares decrease by one. Purchase prices are displayed in a table and in the graph on the top right part of the screen.
If you would like to offer to buy a share, use the text area entitled "Enter Bid price". In that text area you can enter the price at which you are offering to buy a share, and then select "Submit Bid Price". Please do so now. You will notice that 9 numbers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the column entitled "Bid Price". The highest price will always be on the top of that list and will be highlighted. If you press "SELL", you will sell one share for the highest current bid price. You can also highlight one of the other prices if you wish to sell at a price other than the highest.
Please sell a share now by highlighting a price and selecting "SELL". Since each of you had put a share for purchase and attempted to sell a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares you started out with. This is because you sold one share and bought one share. You will now have a practice period. Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not influence your position later in the experiment. The goal of the practice period is only to master the use of the interface. Please be sure that you have successfully submitted bid prices and ask prices. Also be sure that you have accepted both bid and ask prices. You are free to ask questions, by raising your hand, during the practice period.
On the right hand side you have one price diagram showing this period's recent purchase prices (the same in the "Purchase Price" list). On the horizontal axis will be the number of shares traded, and on the vertical axis is the price paid for that particular share. You will also see a graph on the historical performance of the experiment, where the blue dots indicate the maximum price a share was traded in that period, the black dots indicate the average price, and the red dots indicate the minimum price.
Specific Instructions for this experiment
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods. In each period, there will be a market open for 240 seconds, in which you may buy and sell shares. Shares are assets with a life of 15 periods, and your inventory of shares carries over from one trading period to the next. You may receive dividends for each share in your inventory at the end of each of the 15 trading periods.
At the end of each trading period, including period 15 the computer randomly draws a dividend for the period. Each period, each share you hold at the end of the period:
-earns you a dividend of 0 tokens with a probability of 25% -earns you a dividend of 8 tokens with a probability of 25% -earns you a dividend of 28 tokens with a probability of 25% -earns you a dividend of 60 tokens with a probability of 25% Each of the four numbers is equally likely. The average dividend in each period is 24. The dividend is added to your cash balance automatically. After the dividend is paid at the end of period 15, there will be no further earnings possible from shares.
Average Holding Value Table
You can use the following table to help you make decisions.
There are 5 columns in the table. The first column, labeled Ending Period, indicates the last trading period of the experiment. The second column, labeled Current Period, indicates the period during which the average holding value is being calculated. The third column gives the number of holding periods from the period in the second column until the end of the experiment. The fourth column, labeled Average Dividend per Period, gives the average amount that the dividend will be in each period for each unit held in your inventory. The fifth column, labeled Average Holding Value Per Unit of Inventory, gives the average value for each unit held in your inventory from now until the end of the experiment. That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for the remainder of the experiment, you will earn on average the amount listed in column 5.
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining. Since the dividend on a Share has a 25% chance of being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 28 and a 25% chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend is on average 24 per period for each Share. If you hold a Share for 7 periods, the total dividend for the Share over the 7 periods is on average 7*24 = 168. Therefore, the total value of holding a Share over the 7 periods is on average 168.
Making Predictions
In addition to the money you earn from dividends and trading, you can make money by accurately forecasting the trading prices of all future periods. You will indicate your forecasts before each period begins on the computer screen.
The cells correspond to the periods for which you have to make a forecast. Each input box is labeled with a period number representing a period for which you need to make a forecast. The money you receive from your forecasts will be calculated in the following manner
Accuracy
Your earnings Within 10% of actual price 5 tokens Within 25% of actual price 2 tokens Within 50% of actual price 1 tokens
You may earn money on each and every forecast. The accuracy of each forecast will be evaluated separately. For example, for period 2, your forecast of the period 2 trading price that you made prior to period 1 and your forecast of period 2 trading price that you made prior to period 2 will be evaluated separately from each other. For example, if both fall within 10% of the actual price in period 2, you will earn 2*5 tokens = 10 tokens. If exactly one of the two predictions falls within 10% of the actual price and the other falls within 25% but not 10% you will earn 5 tokens + 2 tokens = 7 tokens.
Your Earnings
Your earnings for the entire experiment will equal the amount of cash that you have at the end of period 15, after the last dividend has been paid, plus the $5 you receive for participating. The amount of cash you will have is equal to:
Money 
